Madrid’s M-30: A Revolving Door for Private Interests?
In a move that has ignited controversy and raised questions about the transparency of Madrid’s public administration, the City Council has appointed Sonia Suárez, former production director of Emesa – the private entity that for two decades held a 20% stake in the M-30’s management company – to an analogous position within Calle 30, the company now fully responsible for the M-30’s operation. This appointment comes just one month after the M-30’s management was fully renationalized, ending a partial privatization that cost Madrid taxpayers an estimated 1.1 billion euros.
Critics are quick to point out a glaring conflict of interest, suggesting that the spirit of public management is being undermined by the very individuals who profited from its private predecessor. The City Council, through its Department of Public Works, insists that all hiring procedures have been conducted “in accordance with regulations” and “based on principles of equality, merit, and capacity.” However, a deeper look into Suárez’s career trajectory and the M-30’s recent history reveals a pattern that warrants closer scrutiny.
The Executive’s Journey: From Private Profit to Public Service?
Sonia Suárez worked at Emesa from 2006, shortly after the partial privatization of the M-30’s management. She held the senior position of production manager from February 2017 to December 2025, when she resigned. Just one month later, in January 2026, she joined Calle 30. This timing aligns perfectly with the completion of the renationalization process, raising eyebrows among those who advocate for genuine public control.
As production director at Calle 30, Suárez is responsible for coordinating the planning, organization, and supervision of operational resources and processes, including asphalt paving, safety, and signage. Calle 30, in turn, is the municipal company charged with maintaining and operating the M-30, Spain’s busiest highway and home to Europe’s most extensive urban tunnel network, spanning 32.5 kilometers around the city center.
A “Clear Conflict of Interest,” Warns Former Official
Despite the renationalization, Calle 30 – now led by the controversial former councilman Javier Ramírez – continues to execute many of its operations through contracts with private companies. Paradoxically, some of these contracts may be awarded to companies that were formerly part of Emesa itself. This is precisely why Samuel Romero, who served as an authorized representative for Calle 30 during Manuela Carmena’s mayoral term, sees “a clear conflict of interest” in placing a former Emesa executive in a high-ranking position within the public company. Romero even suggests that Suárez’s ties to her former employer might still be active: “When you are appointed to a public position, you usually request a leave of absence from your original job.”
Romero highlights the challenging nature of Suárez’s new role and the inherent difficulties arising from her previous position: “She has worked for companies that she will now have to oversee. This complicates the enforcement of contracts, which is already very difficult given the resistance put up by companies seeking to save every last penny.” While acknowledging Suárez’s “knowledge of civil engineering and her areas of expertise,” Romero questions the appointment itself, emphasizing the ethical implications.
“She has worked for companies that she will now have to oversee. This complicates the enforcement of contracts, which is already very difficult given the resistance put up by companies seeking to save every last penny.”
– Samuel Romero, Former Authorized Representative for Calle 30
Million-Euro Contracts and Persistent Private Influence
Some of these contracts amount to significant sums, such as the nearly 198 million euro agreement formalized last November (when renationalization was not yet complete, and Suárez was still at Emesa) for the operation and maintenance of the M-30’s tunnel network. The contracting body, Calle 30 itself, awarded this to a Temporary Business Union (UTE) comprising Serveo, API Movilidad, Sociedad Ibérica de Construcciones Eléctricas, and Asfaltos Vicálvaro. Some of these companies were previously integrated into Emesa, which was formed by Ferrovial (now Serveo), Api Conservación (part of the same group as Api Movilidad, imesAPI), and Dragados.
The Department of Public Works of the Madrid City Council (whose delegate, Paloma García Romero, presides over Calle 30) justifies these actions by stating that “the company is adapting its structure and resources to the new management model.” In this context, they argue, “several personnel recruitment procedures have been initiated to cover new human resource needs.” They maintain that all these procedures have been carried out “in accordance with applicable regulations, based on the principles of equality, merit, and capacity, through corresponding open calls to all interested parties, previously authorized and informed by the Madrid City Council.”
A “Lost Opportunity” for a Strong Public Enterprise
In light of Suárez’s appointment and the millions of euros still being allocated to private companies for M-30 maintenance, Romero questions why the Almeida administration has not leveraged renationalization to “create a strong public company.” Such an entity, he argues, could handle “basic, ordinary, or repetitive functions, even if specific tasks are then subcontracted.” He laments that “they have again put out to tender conservation and maintenance contracts, and the former members of Emesa are now the beneficiaries. A brutal opportunity to save on companies’ profit margins has been lost.”
The problem, according to the former M-30 advisor, is that this “contradicts the privatization model, which they only abandoned because it entailed significant funds and was clearly an atrocity.” Romero believes that “they maintain the underlying principle of inflating contracts for construction companies, and now they put someone who knows that model perfectly and comes from it in charge of supervision.”
The Long Road to Renationalization: A History of Opacity and Debt
Calle 30’s management became 100% public only on January 1st, 2026, when the Madrid City Council ended a partial privatization that had been in place since the era of Alberto Ruiz-Gallardón, costing an additional 55 million euros annually. This figure was calculated during Romero’s tenure in 2017 when he conducted an audit of its financial situation. In total, the deficit is estimated to be around 1.1 billion euros.
Romero recalls that when Carmena’s team came to power, they witnessed firsthand the “opacity in the documentation of contracts and tenders” within Calle 30: “Our work was not only modernization or sustainability but also asking what we had done with public money. We encountered opaque work certifications and maintenance contracts with ambiguous and duplicated concepts. We sought greater transparency and to establish mechanisms to avoid repeating mistakes.”
He emphasizes that continuing the contract with Emesa beyond 2025 would have been “illegal” and that his time leading the company “helped bring that reality to light.” The reality of “an inefficient model that should never have been established.” His greatest regret is not having been able to complete renationalization in the previous decade before the Popular Party regained power: “We didn’t have enough time,” he says. The dismissal of Carlos Sánchez Mato, the councilor for Economy and Finance who controlled Calle 30 until his removal in December 2017, thwarted more ambitious plans.
The End of a “Harmful” Model Amidst New Contracts
In 2005, Gallardón opted for a management model through a mixed company to carry out the ambitious undergrounding of the highway, with 80% municipal ownership and the remaining 20% in the hands of several construction companies grouped under Empresa de Mantenimiento y Explotación SA (Emesa). Ferrovial, Dragados, and Api Conservación formed this company to sign a contract that could have extended until 2040.
“Harmful to municipal public coffers.” This is how the final opinion on the Madrid Calle 30 audit, based on a report from the Court of Accounts, defined the management model chosen for the company. The investigation promoted during Carmena’s mandate revealed that Emesa’s management architecture was devised by Gallardón’s team to try to prevent the debt generated during the M-30’s undergrounding from being counted against the City Council’s funds. Therefore, although Calle 30 began as a public company in 2004, a year later it allowed private capital to enter to avoid European Union controls and enable the former mayor to execute the work at the cost of indebtedness not permitted by community control institutions.
The agreement, however, included the option of its revocation in 2025. A clause that José Luis Martínez-Almeida’s government eventually exercised. By doing so, it stopped paying VAT or corporate tax on all its operations, as well as the mandatory dividends for having established a company instead of assuming public management.
The irrevocable decision was made by the Department of Public Works and Equipment after a report from the Treasury Department that informed of the savings for public coffers. The change in management implies that all maintenance work carried out by Emesa must be tendered in new management contracts, such as the one awarded at the end of 2025 for almost 200 million euros.
Currently, Calle 30 is in the process of hiring other senior executives, such as the managing director, whose job offer was published on March 13th. The annual remuneration for the position is over 103,000 euros gross. The Department of Public Works states that “it will be resolved in accordance with the published bases through the foreseen procedure.” They add that the call aims to “fill the vacancy that will arise with the departure of the current managing director [Antonio Tocino de la Iglesia], who has communicated his desire to terminate his employment relationship with Madrid Calle 30 in a position of utmost importance for the daily management of the service.” Other more advanced calls will incorporate three administrative officers, an installations area technician, a structures technician, another operations technician, and one specialized in 3D digital models.
Our Questions Remain Unanswered
- Why was a former senior executive from a private company that profited from the M-30’s management hired into a similar role within the newly renationalized public entity?
- Does the City Council acknowledge the potential for conflicts of interest in such appointments, especially when the new public entity continues to contract with companies formerly associated with the private management?
- What measures are being taken to ensure that the renationalization of the M-30 truly serves the public interest and avoids a revolving door of personnel and contracts that benefit private entities?
- What is the City Council’s strategy to maximize savings and efficiency following renationalization, particularly concerning the awarding of new maintenance contracts?
What’s Next?
This investigation continues. We urge any current or former employees of Calle 30 or the Madrid City Council with information regarding these practices to contact us. Your identity will be protected, and full anonymity is guaranteed.
Source: Investigative journalism, internal documents obtained from a whistleblower, interviews with former officials, public records, and analysis of M-30 management contracts.
